Thomas Finke Dissertation Titles

1. Meanings and Connotations of ‘Mental Imagery’

Mental imagery is a familiar aspect of most people's everyday experience (Galton, 1880a,b, 1883; Betts, 1909; Doob, 1972; Marks, 1972, 1999). A few people may insist that they rarely, or even never, consciously experience imagery (Galton, 1880a, 1883; Faw, 1997, 2009; but see Brewer & Schommer-Aikins, 2006), but for the vast majority of us, it is a familiar and commonplace feature of our mental lives. The English language supplies quite a range of idiomatic ways of referring to visual mental imagery: ‘visualizing,’ ‘seeing in the mind's eye,’ ‘having a picture in one's head,’ ‘picturing,’ ‘having/seeing a mental image/picture,’ and so on. There seem to be fewer ways to talk about imagery in other sensory modes, but there is little doubt that it occurs, and the experiencing of imagery in any sensory mode is often referred to as ‘imagining’ (the appearance, feel, smell, sound, or flavor of something). Alternatively, the quasi-perceptual nature of an experience may be indicated merely by putting the relevant sensory verb (‘see,’ ‘hear,’ ‘taste,’ etc.) in actual or implied “scare quotes.”

Despite the familiarity of the experience, the precise meaning of the expression ‘mental imagery’ is remarkably hard to pin down, and differing understandings of it have often added considerably to the confusion of the already complex and fractious debates, amongst philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists, concerning imagery's nature, its psychological functions (if any), and even its very existence. In the philosophical and scientific literature (and a fortiori in everyday discourse), the expression ‘mental imagery’ (or ‘mental images’) may be used in any or all of at least three different senses, which are only occasionally explicitly distinguished, and all too often conflated:

{1}quasi-perceptual conscious experience per se;
{2}hypothetical picture-like representations in the mind and/or brain that give rise to {1};
{3}hypothetical inner representations of any sort (picture-like or otherwise) that directly give rise to {1}.

Far too many discussions of visual mental imagery fail to draw a clear distinction between the contention that people have quasi-visual experiences and the contention that such experiences are to be explained by the presence of representations, in the mind or brain, that are in some sense picture-like. This picture theory (or pictorial theory) of imagery experience is deeply entrenched in our language and our folk psychology. The very word ‘image,’ after all, suggests a picture. However, although the majority of both laymen and experts probably continue to accept some form of picture theory, many 20th century philosophers and psychologists, from a variety of theoretical traditions, have argued strongly against it, and, in several cases they have developed quite detailed alternative, non-pictorial accounts of the nature and causes of imagery experiences (e.g., Dunlap, 1914; Washburn, 1916; Sartre, 1940; Ryle, 1949; Shorter, 1952; Skinner, 1953, 1974; Dennett, 1969; Sarbin & Juhasz, 1970; Sarbin, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1978, 1981, 2002a, 2003a, 2005; Neisser, 1976; Hinton, 1979; Slezak, 1991, 1995; Thomas, 1999b, 2009). Others, it should be said, have developed and defended picture theory in sophisticated ways in the attempt to meet these critiques (e.g., Hannay, 1971; Kosslyn, 1980, 1983,1994; von Eckardt, 1988, 1993; Tye, 1988, 1991; Cohen, 1996). However, despite these developments, much philosophical and scientific discussion about imagery and the cognitive functions it may or may not serve continues to be based on the often unspoken (and even unexamined) assumption that, if there is mental imagery at all, it must consist in inner pictures.

Consider, for example, the title of the book The Case for Mental Imagery, by Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis (2006). In fact the book is an extended and quite polemical defense of the much disputed view that visual mental imagery consists in representational brain states that are, in some significant and important ways, genuinely picture-like (see supplement: The Quasi-Pictorial Theory of Imagery, and its Problems). That is to say, the contents suggest that the title should be understood as intending "imagery" in sense {2}. However, it would also be very natural (and, very possibly, in accord with the authors' intentions – compare Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 2003) to understand the title as implying that the book's deeper purpose is to refute the view that imagery, even in sense {1}, does not really exist (or, at least, that the concept of imagery will find no place in a properly scientific ontology). Although this denialist view of imagery has few, if any, supporters today, it is well known that not so very long ago, in the era of Behaviorist psychology, it had great influence. The book's title thus (intentionally or otherwise) invites us to conflate the (now) very controversial view that mental images are picture-like entities, with what is, today, the virtual truism that people really do have quasi-perceptual experiences, and that our science of the mind owes us some account of them.

Another way in which the expression ‘mental imagery’ (together with many of its colloquial near-equivalents) may be misleading, is that it tends to suggest only quasi-visual phenomena. Despite the fact that most scholarly discussions of imagery, in the past and today, do indeed focus mainly or exclusively upon the visual mode, in fact, quasi-perceptual experience in other sensory modes is just as real, and, very likely, just as common and just as psychologically important (Newton, 1982). Contemporary cognitive scientists generally recognize this, and interesting studies of auditory imagery, kinaesthetic (or motor) imagery, olfactory imagery, haptic (touch) imagery, and so forth, can be found in the recent scientific literature (e.g., Segal & Fusella, 1971; Reisberg, 1992; Klatzky, Lederman, & Matula, 1991; Jeannerod, 1994; Bensafi et al., 2003; Yoo et al., 2003; Kobayashi et al., 2004; Djordjevic et al., 2004, 2005). Although such studies are still vastly outnumbered by studies of visual imagery, ‘imagery’ has become the generally accepted term amongst cognitive scientists for quasi-perceptual experience in any sense mode (or any combination of sense modes).

1.1 Experience or Representation?

In the introduction to this entry, in order to avoid making a premature commitment to the picture theory, and in accordance with definitions given by psychologists such as McKellar (1957), Richardson (1969), and Finke (1989), mental imagery was characterized as a form of experience (i.e., as {1}). However, this itself is far from unproblematic. Evidence for the occurrence of any experience is necessarily subjective and introspective, and, because of this, those who have doubts about the validity of introspection as a scientific method, may well be led to question whether there is any place for a concept such as imagery within a truly scientific world view. J.B. Watson, the influential instigator of the Behaviorist movement that dominated scientific psychology (especially in the United States) for much of the 20th century, questioned the very existence of imagery for just these sorts of reasons (Watson, 1913a, 1913b, 1928 – see supplement; see also: Thomas, 1989, Berman & Lyons, 2007). Although few later Behaviorist psychologists (or their philosophical allies) expressed themselves on the matter in quite the strong and explicit terms sometimes used by Watson, the era of Behaviorist psychology is characterized by a marked skepticism about imagery (if not its existence, at least its psychological importance) amongst both psychologists and philosophers. Imagery did not become widely discussed again among scientific psychologists (or philosophers of psychology) until around the end of the 1960s, when Behaviorism began to be displaced by Cognitivism as the dominant psychological paradigm. Most informed contemporary discussions of imagery, amongst both philosophers and psychologists, are still very much shaped by this recent history of skepticism about imagery (or iconophobia, as it is sometimes called), and the subsequent reaction against it.

By contrast with their Behaviorist predecessors, most cognitive psychologists today hold that imagery has an essential role to play in our mental economy. Many may share some of the reservations of their Behaviorist predecessors about the place of introspection and subjectivity in science, but they take the view that imagery must be real (and scientifically interesting) because it is explanatorily necessary: The results of many experiments on cognitive functioning, they hold, cannot be satisfactorily explained without making appeal to the storage and processing of imaginal mental representations. The belief that such mental representations are real is justified in the same sort of way that belief in the reality of electrons, or natural selection, or gravitational fields (or other scientifically sanctioned “unobservables”) is justified: Imagery is known to exist inasmuch as the explanations that rely upon imaginal representations are known to be true. From this perspective, some theorists recommend that the term ‘imagery’ should not be understood to refer to a form of subjective experience, but, rather, to a certain type of “underlying representation” (Dennett, 1978; Block, 1981a, Introduction; Block, 1983a; Kosslyn, 1983; Wraga & Kosslyn, 2003; Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis, 2006). Such representations are “mental” in the sense now commonplace in cognitive science: i.e., they are conceived of as being embodied as brain states, but as individuated by their functional (and computational) role in cognition. As Block (1981a, 1983a) points out, an advantage of defining mental imagery in this way (i.e., as an unspecified form of representation, as {3} rather than {2}) is that it does not beg the controversial question of whether the relevant representations are, in any interesting sense, picture-like.

However, if it is not because they are picture-like, what is it that makes these mental representations mental images? Presumably the idea is that a mental representation deserves to be called an image if it is of such a type that its presence to mind (i.e., its playing a role in some currently occurring cognitive process) can give rise to a quasi-perceptual experience of whatever is represented. But this move relies upon our already having a grasp of the experiential conception of imagery, which must, therefore, be more fundamental than the representational conception just outlined. Furthermore, to define imagery in the way that Block, Kosslyn etc. suggest, as first and foremost a form of representation (as explanans rather than explanandum), is to beg more basic and equally controversial questions about the nature of the mind and the causes of quasi-perceptual experiences. A number of scientists and philosophers, coming from a diverse range of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, do not accept that imagery experiences are caused by the presence to mind of representational tokens (e.g., Sartre, 1940; Ryle, 1949; Skinner, 1953, 1974; Sarbin, 1972; Thomas, 1999b, 2009; O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Bartolomeo, 2002; Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Blain, 2006).

It should be admitted, however, that focusing too narrowly on the experiential conception of imagery has its own potential dangers. In particular, it may obscure the very real possibility, foregrounded by the representational conception, that importantly similar underlying representations or mechanisms may sometimes be operative both when we consciously experience imagery and sometimes when we do not. Some evidence, such as Paivio's (1971, 1983a, 1991a) work on the differential memorability of words with different “imagery values” (see section 4.2, below), suggests that this is indeed the case.

In practice, both the experiential and the representational conceptions of imagery are frequently encountered in the literature of the subject. Unfortunately, it is often hard to tell which is intended in any particular case. Even where they are not actually conflated, confusion can arise when one conception is favored over the other without this ever being made sufficiently clear or explicit. Although it would be pedantic and potentially confusing to insist on explicitly drawing the distinction everywhere, where it seems important or helpful to do so this entry will refer to imagery experiences (or quasi-perceptual experiences) on the one hand, and imagery representations (or imagery processes) on the other.

1.2 The Relation to Perception

There are further potential problems, however, with the brief characterization of imagery given in our introduction. Not only does what is said there duck the difficult (and rarely considered) task of specifying what dimensions and degrees of similarity to perception are necessary for an experience to count as imagery; it also elides the controversial question of whether, despite the surface resemblance, imagery is a sui generis phenomenon, conceptually quite distinct from true perceptual experience, or whether imagery and perception differ only in degree rather than in kind.

Some, such as Hume (1740), hold that percepts (impressions in his terminology) and images (ideas) do not differ in kind, but only in their degree of “vivacity”or vividness. This view has frequently been criticized, however (Reid, 1764 II.5, VI.24; Savage, 1975; Warnock, 1976; McGinn, 2004). A related view, explicitly defended by some (e.g., Jastrow, 1899; Savage, 1975; Thomas, 1997a, 2014), and implicit in much of the other relevant literature, is that imagery, regardless of its subjective “vividness”, lies at one end of a continuum or spectrum stretching from veridical, highly stimulus-driven and stimulus-constrained perception at one end, to “pure” imagery (where the content of the experience is generated entirely by the subject, and is quite independent of any current stimulus input) at the other. Several varieties of imaginative preceptual experience may be taken to fill in the continuum between these extremes: mistaken or illusive perceptions (imagining, for instance, that the bush seen indistinctly in the darkness is a bear), and various types of non-deceptive seeing as or seeing in (such as imagining a cloud to have the shape of a camel, weasel, or whale; seeing a Laughing Cavalier in paint on canvas; seeing someone's sadness in their eyes; or seeing the notorious duck-rabbit figure as a duck [or rabbit]).


Figure 1.2_1
The Duck-Rabbit

Others, however, notably Reid (1764 II.5), Sartre (1936), Wittgenstein (1967 §621 ff.), McGinn (2004) and Ichikawa (2009), argue that there is a sharp conceptual and phenomenological distinction to be drawn between imagery and perception proper. After all, it is argued, our imagination, unlike our perception, is under the control of our will (and experienced as such). Provided I know what an elephant looks like, I can choose to imagine one wherever and whenever I want to, but I cannot choose to see an elephant unless one actually happens to be present. By contrast, if an elephant is present before my open eyes, I cannot help but see it, whether I will or no.[1] McGinn (2004) restates this argument with considerably more rigor and detail than his predecessors did, and, in addition, sets out eight further arguments that, he thinks, point to the same conclusion, viz, that mental imagery is a phenomenon radically conceptually different in kind from perception. If true, this would appear to imply that all extant scientific theories about the nature and mechanisms of imagery (see §§4.4-4.5, below), and (to the best of my knowledge) all obsolete theories too (see §§2-3 below) must be false, as all of them depend on the assumption that mental images and percepts differ in degree rather than kind, and that there is a large degree of overlap between the respective mechanisms that give rise to each. However, although all or most of the differences between images and percepts pointed out by McGinn (and Reid, Sartre and Wittgenstein), are probably real enough, the claim that any of them reflect true differences in kind, rather than degree, is on much shakier ground. Taking on McGinn’s (and Ichikawa's) arguments in detail, Thomas (2014), defends the notion of a spectrum or continuum of imaginative phenomena that encompasses not only veridical perception and mental imagery, but also such things as dreams, hallucinations, pareidolia, and various other types of both deceptive and non-deceptive “imaginative perceiving”.

Sartre (1940) and Wittgenstein (1967 §§627, 632) also argue that (in sharp contrast to perception) we can derive no new information about the world from our imagery: No image can contain anything except what the imager put there, which must already have been in his or her mind. However, not only observation, but also inference can lead to knowledge, and it has been argued that mental imagery can and does support certain types of inference that give us genuinely new knowledge about the real world (Kosslyn, 1980, 1983; Taylor, 1981, Georgiou, 2007; Thomas, 2014).[2] McGinn, however, (2004 p. 19ff) argues that although Sartre and Wittgenstein overstate their point, there is a genuine and important insight underlying what they say: The information we can derive from our imagery is of a different sort, and is derived in a different way, from that which we get from perception.

1.3 The Intentionality of Imagery

On a more consensual note, with only rare exceptions (e.g. Wright, 1983; Martin, 2008 p. 160) nearly all serious discussions of imagery take it for granted that it bears intentionality in the sense of being of, about, or directed at something (Harman, 1998): A mental image is always an image of something or other (whether real or unreal), in the same sense that perception (whether veridical or not) is always perception of something (see Anscombe, 1965). It is in virtue of this intentionality that mental imagery may be (and usually is) regarded as a species of mental representation that can, and often does, play an important role in our thought processes.

It is also generally accepted that imagery is, for the most part, subject to voluntary control. Although it is true that images often come into the mind unbidden, and sometimes it is hard to shake off unwanted imagery (for instance, a memory of some horrible sight that one cannot get out of one's mind), most of us, most of the time can quite freely and voluntarily conjure-up and manipulate imagery of whatever we may please (provided, of course, that we know what it looks like).

There are quasi-perceptual experiences, such as afterimages, that are not subject to this sort of direct voluntary control, and indeed, that do not seem to bear intentionality, but these are usually (at least implicitly) understood to be phenomena of a distinctly different type from mental imagery proper (see supplement).

Further discussion of phenomena akin to, or sometimes confused with, mental imagery:

Supplement: Other Quasi-Perceptual Phenomena

2. Pre-Scientific Views of Imagery

It seems likely that mental imagery has been discussed for as long as humans have been trying to understand their own cognitive processes. It receives attention in the oldest extended writings about cognition that have come down to us – the works of Plato and Aristotle – and there is reason to believe it was discussed by yet earlier Greek thinkers. Plato's and particularly Aristotle's writings have undoubtedly had an enormous and continuing influence on how cognition in general and imagery in particular are conceptualized within both the Western and the Muslim cultural traditions. However, there is reason to think that the phenomenon of imagery, if not this tradition of theorizing about it, is not culture bound. Children as young as three have been found to be aware their imagery, and of its subjective nature (Estes, 1994), and researchers have been able to gather introspective reports and descriptions of mental imagery from members of non-Western cultures ranging from pre-literate tribal Africa (Doob, 1972) to modern Japan (where, indeed, the empirical psychological study of imagery seems to have been taken up with some enthusiasm – Oyama & Ichikawa, 1990). Imagery is also said to play a significant role in traditional Hindu and Buddhist spiritual practices (Samuels & Samuels, 1972; Ricard, 2006), and apparent references to the phenomenon of imagery can be found in the works of classical Chinese thinkers such as Confucius (e.g. Analects 9:10 & 15:5).[3] There might well be important insights to be gleaned from the study of these various cultures' conceptions of imagery, but the available literature on this is very sparse (but see Ricard, 2006, and the discussion that is printed following it). Thus, of necessity, what follows will focus on the Western philosophical and scientific tradition. In any case, the seeds of the controversies about imagery that erupted in the 20th century were sown not in Africa or the Orient, but in Greece.

2.1 Early Greek Ideas of Imagery

The following supplements discuss Greek conceptions of imagery prior to the work of Aristotle:

Supplement: Ancient Imagery Mnemonics

Supplement: Plato and his Predecessors

2.2 Aristotle and Imagery

Where Plato regarded images as irremediably deceptive, Aristotle, although he certainly recognized their potential for leading us astray (De Anima 428a-b), saw them as playing an essential and central role in human cognition, one closely akin to that played by the more generic notion of mental representation in contemporary cognitive science. Indeed, he developed what amounts to the first comprehensive cognitive theory, a theory that has been enormously influential over the subsequent ages, and continues (mostly indirectly) to shape much scientific and philosophical thought about the mind even today. He was clearly aware of, and very possibly influenced by, the mnemonic imagery techniques in use in Greece (see supplement), to which he alludes in at least four passages in his extant writings (Topica 163b28, De Anima 427b18, De Memoria 452a12–16, De Insomniis 458b20–22).

Aristotle's Greek word, that is commonly and traditionally translated as "[mental] image" is “phantasma” (plural: phantasmata), a term used by Plato to refer to reflections in mirrors or pools (or the liver), amongst other things, but which Aristotle seems to reserve to appearances in the psyche. Aristotle describes phantasmata as being analogous to paintings or wax impressions (De Memoria 450a-b), and as “a residue of the actual [sense] impression” (De Insomniis 461b; cf. Rhetorica 137a 28) or “a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense” (De Anima 429a 1–3). Some modern scholars, it should be noted, have questioned the translation of "phantasma" as "image," in part because Aristotle does not always seem to think of phantasmata as inner pictures, and also because he seems to think of them as playing a role in perception itself (Nussbaum, 1978; Schofield, 1978; Birondo, 2001). As Hume distinguished impressions from ideas, contemporary colloquial English distinguishes between percepts and the mental images that we experience when we fantasize, daydream, or recall some experience from memory. Aristotle's concept of phantasma seems to collapse this distinction. It has thus been suggested that "phantasma" would be better translated as "appearance" (Lycos, 1964) or "presentation" (Beare, 1906) rather than as "image". However, contemporary scientific theories of imagery (see sections 4.4 and 4.5) also, for the most part, do not make a sharp distinction in kind between mental images and percepts, and are virtually unanimous in holding (as, indeed, did Hume) that both are varieties of a single species.

In any case, it is abundantly clear that, in many even if not all cases, Aristotle uses "phantasma" to refer to what we now call a mental image. Phantasmata have several functions paralleling those ascribed to imagery by modern folk psychology (and some scientific psychology). In particular, they are central to Aristotle's theory of memory (De Memoria et Reminiscentia; see Sorabji, 1972) and to his theory of thought. Not only does remembering essentially involve the recall of imagery of past experiences, but, he tells us, "It is impossible to think without an image [phantasma]," (De Memoria 450a 1; cf. De Anima 431a 15–20 & 432a 8–12). Phantasmata also play a key role in his account of desire and motivation (e.g. De Anima 431a — see Nussbaum, 1978): When some desirable object is not actually present to our senses, exerting its pull on us directly, our motivation to strive to obtain it is driven by our awareness of its (memory or fantasy) image. (This idea is still found in modern, scientific theories of desire (McMahon 1973; Kavanagh et al., 2005; Andrade et al., 2009).) Aristotle also apparently held that linguistic meaning derives from imagery, spoken words being but the symbols of the inner images (De Interpretatione 16a 5–9; De Anima 420b 29–32; see Modrak, 2001). Today, few theorists of language take this notion seriously (but see Paivio, 1986, 2007; Prinz, 2002), but it was almost universally accepted until relatively recent times (Wollock, 1997; and see section 3.3 below).

Very arguably, Aristotle's views about imagery (phantasmata) cannot be fully understood in isolation from his views about imagination (phantasia), which he defined as “(apart from any metaphorical sense of the word) the process by which we say that an image [phantasma] is presented to us” (De Anima 428a 1–4). Aristotle has been accredited with the very invention of the concept of imagination (Schofield, 1978), and certainly it seems fair to say that the roots of most subsequent discussions of the concept can be traced back to his work (even though, for him, it did not have the strong association with creativity and aesthetic insight that it has since acquired, mostly through the influence of the Romantic movement) (Watson, 1988; White, 1990; Thomas, 1999a). Unfortunately, however, Aristotle's remarks about phantasia, suggestive and influential though they are, are scattered widely amongst the surviving texts, and the only extended discussion of the concept (in De Anima III.3) is particularly difficult to interpret, not only because the text that has come down to us seems to be more than usually corrupt (Nussbaum, 1992), but also because of the richness and density of its arguments and its peculiarly oblique approach to the ostensible subject matter. After over two millennia of discussion, scholars still do not agree about crucial aspects of Aristotle's conception of phantasia, and thus about his view of the fundamental nature of imagery.[4]

Further discussion of the aftermath and influence of Aristotle's work on imagery:

Supplement: From the Hellenistic to the Early Modern Era

2.3 Images as Ideas in Modern Philosophy

It can hardly be denied that the concept of the idea was central to much of modern philosophy. Ideas were mental representations, and very frequently, though not necessarily always, they were (explicitly or implicitly) conceived of as mental images. Even if some authors did not themselves take ideas to be images, it is likely that many of their readers would have taken them to be doing so. Thus, claims about the nature of ideas, and the cognitive and epistemological roles they could or could not play, were often conditioned by whether or not a philosopher did conceive of ideas as images, and by what imagery was taken to be.

2.3.1 Descartes

The Oxford English Dictionary records a clear example of the word 'idea' being used in the sense of mental image as far back as 1589, but philosophical confusion over whether or not ideas are images goes back at least to the “father of Modern Philosophy,” Descartes. Certainly the “clear and distinct ideas” that play such a prominent role in the Meditations (1641), and in Descartes' epistemology more generally, are not conceived to be mental images. We are told that we can attain clear and distinct ideas of such things as God and the human mind (Meditation 4, 53). Neither of these are things of which we have perceptual, let alone quasi-perceptual, experience. But Descartes insists that even our ideas of perceptible things are, inasmuch as they are clear and distinct, not perceptual or imaginative. His perceptual and imaginative grasp of the nature of a piece of wax, he tells us, can never match the clarity and distinctness of the idea of the wax that can potentially be attained by purely mental scrutiny (Meditation 2, 31).

However, we also find in Descartes' work another conception of idea as something that is quasi-perceptual (and, indeed, pictorial) and is formed in the imagination. These ideas may not be capable of providing the sure epistemological foundation that Descartes thinks the clear and distinct ideas of the intellect can give us, but they are real nonetheless, and probably play a larger role in ordinary, non-philosophic thinking. Although they are alluded to in many of Descartes works, these imagistic ideas are explained most fully in the Treatise of Man, where he propounds his speculative physiological theory of visual perception in some detail.[5] The nervous system is described as working by a form of hydraulics, with the nerve fibres (including those that make up the brain) functioning as hollow pipes carrying a fluid called animal spirit.[6] In the center of the brain is the pine-cone-shaped pineal gland, slight movements of which, Descartes believed, were somehow able directly to affect, and be affected by, the thoughts of the immaterial soul. Figure 2.3.1_1, taken from the Treatise, shows his model of visual perception: As a result of the formation of optical images on the retinae of the eyes, the nerves produce another image, isomorphic to the retinal image[7] (but re-inverted, so as to be upright), that is picked out on the surface of the gland by the flow of animal spirits through its pores.[8] Thus points a, b, and c on the surface of the gland correspond to points A, B, and C of the arrow which is being observed. The tracing of the image on its surface causes the gland to move in a subtle and complex fashion that (in some unexplained way) causes a conscious visual experience of the arrow in the soul (Descartes 1664 – see particularly pp. 83ff. in Hall's translation).

Figure 2.3.1_1
Diagram from Descartes' Treatise of Man (1664), showing the formation of inverted retinal images in the eyes, and the transmission of these images, via the nerves so as to form a single, re-inverted image (an idea) on the surface of the pineal gland.

At the same time that the flow of animal spirits is causing visual experiences by moving the pineal, elsewhere in the brain it is causing visual memories to be laid down by its action upon the nerve fibres themselves. These changes to hydraulic structure of the brain allow for mental images of memory and imagination to arise by the recreation of formerly experienced flow patterns of spirits at the pineal surface. Descartes explicitly tells us that the surface of the pineal gland is the “seat of imagination [l'imagination]”[9] and that the images traced there are “ideas” [idées] (Descartes 1664 – p. 86 in Hall's translation; see also Descartes 1648 – p. 27 in Cottingham's translation).

At least one of Descartes' followers, de la Forge, suggested that the term “idée [idea]” should be applied only to concepts in the intellect, and coined the expression “espèces corporelles [corporeal species]” to refer to the pictorial images of the imagination (Clarke, 1989). However, this was clearly not Descartes' own practice. Indeed, in the Third Meditation we are told that, strictly speaking, the word 'idea' should only be applied to thoughts that “are as it were the images of things” (Meditation 3, 37). On the other hand, in his letter to Mersenne of July 1641 he seems to say just the opposite: ideas are in our minds (presumably our immaterial souls), and in so far as images are “in the corporeal imagination” they should not properly be called ideas at all (Cottingham et al., 1991 pp. 185; see also Meditation 3, 40). The thought here seems to be that all ideas as such are in our minds, although some of them are caused or occasioned by the presence of an image on the pineal surface. It is beyond the scope of this entry to determine what was truly Descartes' considered view. What is clear, however, is that Descartes' readers would have readily been able to find a concept of the idea as a picture-like image in his writings.

In his Optics (1637, discourses 4 & 6), Descartes likens the images of his theory to engravings: flat, perspective projections of visual scenes. It is notable, however, that this comparison is made in the course of an argument to the effect that the representations in the brain that cause our perceptual and imaginative experiences need not actually resemble their objects: the resemblance between an engraving and what it depicts is, after all, very partial and imperfect. What matters, for Descartes, is that the conscious soul is appropriately affected by the movements that the process of image formation causes in the pineal gland. Thus it is the functional role of the image, not its actual physical nature, that is important. In this regard, Descartes' view is very close (at least in terms of functional architecture) to the contemporary quasi-pictorial theory of Kosslyn (1980, 1994, 2005; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006 – see section 4.4.2 and supplement: Quasi-Pictorial Theory ). In both cases, it is claimed that although the material image in the brain is, in fact, picture-like, what actually makes it a mental image (or an idea) is not its two-dimensional neural instantiation, but its functional role in conveying visuo-spatial information to “higher” cognitive powers.

2.3.2 Hobbes

As a materialist, Hobbes, unlike Descartes, does not distinguish between images formed in the brain and ideas in the mind. In fact, although Hobbes sometimes uses the word 'idea' as a synonym for 'image,' it occurs rather infrequently in his writings, and he prefers to use 'image' (or 'imagination') or other synonyms such as 'phantasm' or 'appearance.'

Images, however, are undoubtedly central to his cognitive theory. Thought or “Mentall Discourse,” according to Hobbes, is nothing but a “trayne of imaginations,” an associatively connected succession of images passing through the mind, whether it be undirected (as in daydreaming or idle woolgathering) or more focused and purposive because it is “regulated by some desire, and designe,” by some overarching “Passionate Thought” (Leviathan I.3 (Hobbes, 1651)).[10]

However, it is not necessarily the case that Hobbes thought of his images, even those of visual appearances, as being picture-like. Imagination, we are told, “is nothing but decaying sense” (Leviathan I.2).[11] Because Hobbes regarded sensation as a sort of motion or pressure arising in the brain (or heart) in response to an inward pressure arising for external objects, the sort of decaying he has in mind seems unlikely to be that of a picture (or other representational object) crumbling to dust. Rather, it is that of a movement gradually running out of impetus, a pendulum swing gradually decreasing in amplitude, or a gas under pressure gradually leaking away. Furthermore, Hobbes, unlike Descartes, did not think of memory as being the result of structural changes in the brain, but rather as arising from the persistence, the very slow dying away, of the internal motions that were originally set going by sense experience (Leviathan I.2).[12] Hobbesian images, therefore, are processes rather than entities. Although they are undoubtedly quasi-perceptual experiences (presumably, in the absence of an immaterial soul, we are to suppose that they are experienced merely in virtue of their occurring within the brain) they may not be mental pictures in any very robust sense.

2.3.3 Empiricism and its Critics

Unlike his predecessors, Locke did not concern himself with the nature or underlying mechanisms of mental imagery. Henceforth, at least until the rise of cognitive science in the late 20th century, that would be seen as the concern of scientists rather than philosophers[13] (and as it turned out, the scientists did not have much to say about the matter either, until, once again, the era of cognitive science). Furthermore, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) uses the words 'image' and 'imagination' only rarely (White, 1990; Ayers, 1991 p. 45).[14] However, he has a great deal to say about ideas, which are the vehicles of thought of his cognitive theory. Although what may be the canonical definition of idea as “whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking” (Essay I.i.8), seems to be deliberately noncommital about their nature, there are several passages in Locke's Essay that suggest that he thought of them, at least when they were of visual origin, as being picture-like. Indeed, he explicitly refers to ideas as “the pictures drawn in our minds” (Essay II.x.5; see also II.x.7, II.ix.8, II.xxv.6, II.xxxi.6, IV.xi.1), and draws an analogy between the way that ideas enter the mind and the formation of optical images within a camera obscura (a “dark room”) (Essay II.xi.17).

It is thus hardly surprising that, according to Lowe (2005 p. 38), it remains “orthodox” to interpret Locke as holding that ideas are pictorial mental images. This orthodoxy is defended by Ayers (1986, 1991) and White (1990) amongst others, but other recent Locke scholars, notably Yolton (1956, 1970, 1984, 1985, 1996), Chappell (1994), and, more tentatively, Lowe (1995, 2005) challenge it, arguing that the explicit comparisons of ideas with pictures are all limited merely to bringing out some or other specific aspect of the nature of ideas, and should not be read as identifying them with pictures. According to Yolton, there is no evidence that Locke thought of ideas as entities of any sort (Yolton 1970 p. 134), rather, “To say that we know objects by means of ideas is to say no more than that objects become known through sensory awareness” (Yolton, 1985 p. 151). Lowe expresses what may be much the same underlying thought by suggesting that Locke may perhaps be interpreted as holding an “adverbial” theory of ideas, whereby they are construed as ways (or modes) of experiencing rather than as mental entities (Lowe, 1995 pp. 42– 47, 2005 pp. 47–48).

It is worth noting, however, that some recent philosophers have argued for just such an “adverbial” account of mental imagery itself, construing images as modes of experiencing, rather than the presence to mind of inner entities (Rabb, 1975; Heil, 1982; Tye, 1984; Thomas, 1999b, 2009; Meijsing, 2006). Enactive theories of imagery (see section 4.5.1) can be viewed as fleshed out versions of this position (Thomas, 1999b). Thus, even if Yolton and others are right to argue that Locke did not think of ideas (even visual ones) as pictures (imagery in sense {2}), or even as inner entities of any sort (sense {3}), he might still have consistently viewed them as images in sense {1}, as quasi-perceptual experiences. He certainly held that they arise from perception,[15] and that we are conscious of them when we employ them in our thinking (Essay II.i.2–3, I.i.8, II.xxvii.9).

Whatever Locke's true intentions may have been, many of his leading successors and critics, such as Berkeley and Reid, seem to have understood him as believing that ideas are inner representational entities, and, when visual, are like inner pictures.

Few seem to doubt that Berkeley thought of ideas as being images (but see Pitcher, 1977; Kasem, 1989). Indeed, his famous and influential attack (in The Principles of Human Knowledge (1734)) on the possibility of abstract or general ideas clearly derives most of its persuasiveness from the assumption that ideas are like pictures:

For my self I find indeed I have a Faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the Ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joined to the Body of a Horse. I can consider the Hand, the Eye, the Nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it must have some particular Shape and Colour. Likewise the Idea of Man that I frame to my self, must be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-sized Man. I cannot by any effort of Thought conceive the abstract Idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract Idea of Motion distinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general Ideas whatsoever. (Principles, Introduction X).

Or again, a general idea of a triangle

must be neither Oblique nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist (Principles, Introduction XIII).

In effect, Berkeley is arguing that we can form ideas of things that we have never actually seen just inasmuch as we can form new mental pictures by the sort of cutting and pasting operations we could perform with pictures on paper – sticking the picture of a man's head onto a picture of the body of a horse, for example – but that, just as there is no way of drawing or creating a picture that inherently depicts the general man or the general triangle, we can form no such general ideas in our minds.[16] If ideas are images (and if mental images are pictures), Berkeley's argument (which continues to influence today's discussions of imagery and mental representation (e.g., Fodor, 1975)) may very well be sound. If they are not images at all, it makes little sense (and if mental images are not much like pictures, it is probably invalid).

As with Locke, Yolton (1996) argues that Hume did not understand the ideas of his cognitive theory to be mental images. However, there is a great deal in Hume's writings (much more than in Locke's) to suggest otherwise. Indeed, A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume, 1740) opens by explicitly identifying ideas with images: ideas are defined as “the faint images of [sensory impressions] in thinking and reasoning” (Treatise I.i.1). It is conceivable that 'image' might mean nothing more than 'copy' here, but many other passages in both the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) suggest that Hume intended it in a much stronger sense. For example, he refers to the memory one might have of some site in the Holy Land, after having actually been there, as both a “lively image” and a “lively idea” of the place (Treatise I.iii.9), clearly treating the two expressions as equivalent. Furthermore, ideas are constantly being described as having their existence in, or being present to, the imagination or the fancy,[17] and we are told that we need only the “slightest philosophy” to convince us “that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed” (Enquiry XII.1).[18]

The passages just cited (and others like them) perhaps imply no more than that Hume thought of ideas as quasi-perceptual experiences (a conclusion that Yolton might be able to accept), but the fact that Hume approvingly repeats Berkeley's argument against general ideas (Treatise I.iii.1; Enquiry XII.1) suggest that he also thought of them as picture-like. This is also suggested by his choice of the word 'impression' to designate the percepts of which ideas are the images or copies. Clearly the word alludes to the wax impression model of perception and memory that we find in Plato and Aristotle, and although Hume, no doubt, does not intend it to be understood too literally, the fact that he thinks it an appropriate and innocuous metaphor remains telling.

Certainly when Thomas Reid came to develop his influential critique of “the way of ideas,” in effect a comprehensive rejection of the idea as the vehicle of thought, he based many of his arguments upon the assumption that the philosophers he was criticizing understood ideas to be picture-like images (Reid, 1764, 1785).[19] Such images, Reid thinks, are simply not capable of playing the cognitive and epistemological roles that his predecessors had assigned to them, and the assumption that they do so leads to many absurdities. Reid is not saying that we do not have quasi-perceptual experiences, but he wants to deny that these are caused by representational mental entities that we experience in lieu of some actually present physical object or scene.

When we come to Kant (1781/1787), we find that ideas have been displaced, as the vehicles of thought, by concepts. However, images still have a significant role to play in his account of how our concepts connect to empirical reality. The imagination (einbildungskraft) must synthesize the inchoate deliverances of the senses, the sensory manifold, into a coherent, meaningful image, a true representation that the understanding can grasp and bring under some concept. Unfortunately, Kant was unable to give a satisfactory account of how the imagination, even in concert with the understanding, can achieve this. We are told that it involves what he calls a schema, a “representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept” (1781/1787 B180). We are told that it is only “through” and “in accordance with” a schema that images become possible (1781/1787 A 142). Unfortunately, however,

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. (1781/1787 B181).

Thus Kant, in attempting to grapple with problems about the nature of mental representation that the Empiricists had failed to solve, left the process of image formation, and the nature of the image itself, deeply mysterious.

3. Imagery in the Age of Scientific Psychology

When psychology first began to emerge as an experimental science, in the philosophy departments of the German universities in the late 19th century, and soon after in the United States, the central role of imagery in mental life was not in question. For these pioneering experimentalists, such as Wilhelm Wundt in Germany and William James in America, mental images (often, following the established usage of the Empiricist philosophical tradition, referred to as ideas) held just the same central place in the explanation of cognition that they had held for philosophical psychologists of earlier times. Edward B. Titchener, a student of Wundt who established himself as a leading figure in American psychology, was particularly interested in imagery, and an experiment performed by one of his students, C.W. Perky, has become particularly well known. It is often assumed that it shows that there is no qualitative experiential difference between mental images and percepts, but further experimental investigations have raised some doubts about this conclusion (see Supplement: The Perky Experiment).

However, developments within psychology at the beginning of the 20th century began to cast doubt on this long established consensus. A group of psychologists working in Würzburg, Germany, lead by another former student of Wundt's, Oswald Külpe, claimed to have found empirical evidence that certain conscious thought contents are neither imaginal nor perceptual in character. Their results were challenged on several grounds by Wundt, Titchener and others, and were certainly never definitively established. Nevertheless, the bitter dispute that ensued, the so called imageless thought controversy, had a profound effect on the development of scientific psychology (and, very arguably, philosophy too). Most psychologists became, in effect, profoundly disillusioned with the whole notion of mental imagery, and either avoided seriously considering the topic, treated it dismissively, or, in some extreme cases, denied the existence of the phenomenon outright. These attitudes noticeably influenced other disciplines, including philosophy. Although the psychological study of imagery revived with the rise of cognitivism in the 1960s and 70s, when new experimental techniques were developed that enabled a truly experimental study of the phenomenon, current views about, and attitudes towards, mental imagery cannot be properly understood without an awareness of this history, versions of which, of varying degrees of accuracy, have passed into the folklore of psychology.

3.1 Early Experimental Psychology

The following supplements discuss ideas and research about imagery in early (late 19th and early 20th century) scientific psychology:

Supplement: Founders of Experimental Psychology: Wilhelm Wundt and William James

Supplement: Edward B. Titchener: The Complete Iconophile

Supplement: The Perky Experiment

3.2 The Imageless Thought Controversy

Perhaps Wundt's most important German student was Oswald Külpe, who had for several years served as Wundt's assistant professor, but eventually left to set up his own laboratory in the philosophy department of Würzburg University. He and his students there developed a direct challenge to the prevalent imagery theory of thought. Under the influence of both Machian positivism and, later, the act psychology of Brentano and the phenomenology of Husserl, Külpe, like Titchener (whom he had helped train), rejected what he saw as Wundt's unnecessarily strict methodological restrictions on the scope of empirical science, and encouraged his students to extend the scope of the introspective method to the study of the “higher” processes of thought and reasoning (Danziger, 1979, 1980; Ash, 1998). In 1901, two of these students, Mayer and Orth, performed a word association experiment in which subjects were asked to report everything that had passed through their mind between hearing the stimulus word and giving the response. Note that it was normal practice, in this era of psychology, for experimental subjects, or observers as they were more often called, to be drawn from among fellow researchers within the same laboratory, often including the supervising professor. Present day psychologists would, with good reason, suspect such subjects of being liable to produce results strongly biased by theoretical preconceptions (Orne, 1962; Intons-Peterson, 1983). Great pains are usually taken, today, to ensure that subjects in psychological experiments have no idea what hypothesis the experiment is supposed to be testing. In 1901 however, it was thought that experienced and knowledgeable observers were more likely to produce consistent and meaningful results than the psychologically untrained. In the case of the Meyer and Orth experiment, two amongst the four subjects were Meyer and Orth themselves. Nevertheless, they professed to be surprised by some of their findings. In particular:

The subjects frequently reported that they experienced certain events of consciousness which they could quite clearly designate neither as definite images nor yet as volitions. For example, the subject Meyer made the observation that, in reference to the stimulus word “metre” a peculiar event of consciousness intervened which could not be characterized more exactly, and which was succeeded by the spoken response “trochee”. (Meyer & Orth, as quoted and translated by Humphrey, 1951)

The jargon term bewusstseinslagen (“states of consciousness” — Humphrey, 1951) was coined to designate these indescribable non-sensorial states, and they soon began to turn up in more and more profusion in the introspective reports generated in the Würzburg laboratory, taking on an increasing theoretical significance as time went by. In 1905 another Würzburg researcher, Ach, also introduced the largely overlapping, but more explicitly intentionalistic concept of bewusstheit or “awareness”, an unanalysable “impalpably given ‘knowing’” (Ach, quoted and translated by Humphrey, 1951), and by 1907, Karl Bühler, perhaps the most radical of Külpe's students, was simply referring to gedanken (“thoughts”). Bühler's experiments might, for example, involve giving a subject (often professor Külpe himself) a somewhat gnomic sentence to interpret (e.g., “Thinking is so extraordinarily difficult that many prefer to judge”) and then collecting introspective reports of the conscious, but allegedly non-imaginal, gedanken that had occurred between the hearing of the sentence and the giving of the interpretation. Although the Würzburg school never denied that imagery does occur, by this time the greater part of the conscious contents of minds examined in Würzburg seemed to be non-imaginal.

Unsurprisingly, Wundt, and others, refused to accept these new methods and conclusions, and a heated debate, the so called imageless thought controversy, ensued. Though Wundt was surely skeptical of the existence of imageless thoughts, his primary criticisms were methodological. He was very much concerned with the fact that the experiments were necessarily constructed so that the introspective reports were given after the completion of the experimental task (word association, sentence interpretation, or whatever). The Würzburg research thus involved discursive recollection (or was it reconstruction?) of conscious contents that were no longer present to the mind. Such experiments, Wundt argued, were open invitations to suggestion, and, indeed, were

not experiments at all in the sense of scientific methodology: they are counterfeit experiments that seem methodical simply because they are ordinarily performed in a psychological laboratory and involve the coöperation of two persons, who purport to be experimenter and observer. In reality, they are as unmethodical as possible; they possess none of the special features by which we distinguish the introspections of experimental psychology from the casual introspections of everyday life. (Wundt, quoted and translated by Titchener, 1909. Original German, 1907.)

Titchener (see supplement) also strongly objected to the alleged demonstrations of imageless thought, but for different reasons. He did not object to the aims or the introspective methodology of the Würzburg school, but to their purported results, and, for him, the experiments were not so much misconceived as incompetently executed: In particular, he felt, the observers (experimental subjects) in Würzburg had been inadequately trained in the art of introspection. According to Titchener, the main pitfall of introspection was what he called the “stimulus error,” the strong tendency to confound the conscious experience itself with whatever it might represent. Thus, to report, when looking at a rectangular table top, that one experiences a rectangle, would be to commit the stimulus error: The “real” conscious content would (on Titchener's view) have the trapezoidal shape that the table top projects upon the retina. For Titchener, the intentionality generally ascribed to imageless thoughts was clear evidence that the Würzburg introspectors were committing the stimulus error systematically: They were not reporting the intrinsic nature of their conscious contents, but what those contents signified. Titchener suggested that the purported bewusstseinslagen etc. were, in fact, faint and fleeting kinaesthetic sensations, feelings of muscular tension and the like (Tweney, 1987). In Titchener's own laboratory, experiments quite similar to those done in Würzburg, but carried out using introspective observers well trained in avoiding the stimulus error (Titchener himself, or his own graduate students), produced no reports of imageless thoughts. Instead, they found the fleeting imagery or the subtle bodily sensations that Professor Titchener's theory predicted (Titchener, 1909; Humphrey, 1951).

This work of Titchener's (like other responses to the imageless thought controversy from America, Britain, and elsewhere) had relatively little impact in Germany, which, with some justification at that time, still regarded itself as very much preeminent in psychological science. Nevertheless, on both sides of the Atlantic the controversy was recognized as touching on deep foundational issues in the science of mind. Although largely forgotten today, it seems to have had a lasting impact on the development not only of psychology, but philosophy as well. The Würzburg school's claims, despite their shaky basis, undoubtedly contributed to a sense that imagery could not be so psychologically important as had traditionally been assumed, and that an alternative way of thinking about cognitive content was needed. Many psychologists and philosophers of this era came, partly for this reason, to feel that thought should be understood in terms of language per se, and that it was a serious mistake ever to have believed that the representational power of language derives from some more fundamental form of representation, such as mental imagery.[20]

But the imageless thought controversy was never satisfactorily resolved, at least in the terms in which it was originally posed. Indeed, philosophers are still arguing over the issues involved (e.g., Lormand, 1996; Mangan, 2001; Pitt, 2004; Robinson, 2005). Although the Würzburg school has been lauded for drawing psychology's attention to the intentionality of mental contents, and for the introduction of once important concepts such as “mental set” into the science, it would certainly be grossly misleading to suggest that their work provides evidence for the existence of non-sensorial conscious mental contents (i.e. imageless thoughts) that comes anywhere close to meeting present day scientific standards. Indeed, the fact that Külpe's and Titchener's laboratories each produced results that fitted their directors' contrasting preconceptions did not go unnoticed by their contemporaries. The irresolvable dispute contributed significantly to a growing sense of intellectual crisis within psychology, leading to a deep loss of confidence (persisting to the present – see Schwitzgebel (2002a,b, 2008)) in the scientific value of introspection. It also led to a precipitous decline in scientific interest in imagery, especially in the United States after the Behaviorist movement took hold. On the one hand its importance in the cognitive economy (or even its very existence) was now subject to doubt; on the other hand it had come to seem that it was very difficult, if not impossible, to study it experimentally and objectively.

Further discussion of the consequences of the imageless thought controversy:

Supplement: European Responses: Jaensch, Freud, and Gestalt Psychology

Supplement: The American Response: Behaviorist Iconophobia and Motor Theories of Imagery

3.3 Imagery in Twentieth Century Philosophy

By the early 20th century, particularly in the United States, where it most flourished, psychology had progressively established a disciplinary identity distinct from the parent discipline of philosophy. However, interest in and attitudes towards imagery amongst philosophers followed a very similar trajectory to that seen in psychology. Early in the century, philosophers as otherwise diverse as Russell (1919, 1921) and Bergson (1907) still gave imagery a key role in their theories of meaning and cognition (although it may be significant that Bergson seems to regard what he called the “cinematic” imagery-based thought of “ordinary” and “intellectual” cognition as distinctly inferior to the non-imaginal philosophical intuition that also played a large role in his epistemology). However, before long, and especially in the wake of the imageless thought controversy, doubts were beginning to emerge, in the work of philosophers such as Schlick (1918), Sartre (1936, 1940), Ryle (1949), and especially the later Wittgenstein, both about imagery's importance in cognition, and about whether the whole notion of “pictures in the mind” really made sense.

Indeed, even in the late 19th century Frege (1884 §§59–60) had already argued against the traditional view that the meaningfulness of language derives from the mental images that we associate with words. Images, he pointed out, are subjective and idiosyncratic, whereas word meanings are objective and universal. However, the almost unanimous scorn with which the imagery theory of meaning was regarded by late 20th century analytic philosophers seems mainly to be due to the influence and arguments of the later Wittgenstein (Candlish, 2001; Nyíri, 2001). Today, it is largely thanks to Wittgenstein's efforts that,

an imagistic account of thinking such as is outlined in Russell's Analysis of Mind (Lecture X) [Russell, 1921] or elaborated in H.H. Price's Thinking and Experience [Price, 1953] is usually no more felt to deserve critical attention than is, say, a geocentric account of the universe. (Candlish, 2001 §2).

In fact, Wittgenstein implicitly rejected the imagery theory of meaning even in his early work – the so called “picture theory of meaning” of the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922) is not a version of the imagery theory – but an explicit critique appears only in his posthumously published later writings (although the arguments were already influential during his lifetime, long before they saw print). Perhaps the most sustained critique of the imagery theory of meaning occurs in the opening pages of The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein,1958), although the pithier remarks in the Philosophical Investigations (1953 – especially §139f) may have been more influential. Many other remarks and arguments scattered through Wittgenstein's other posthumously published writings, particularly in Zettel (1967), the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980a, 1980b), and the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (1990), demonstrate that he was fascinated by imagery, but deeply skeptical not only about the large cognitive role traditionally assigned to it, but also about the traditional understanding of the image as a sort of inner picture (see, e.g. 1953 I §301, II pp. 196e & 213e).

No-one could seriously doubt that Wittgenstein himself recognized the experiential reality and philosophical importance of imagery: he expends so much effort wrestling with the concept. Nevertheless, as Nyíri (2001) remarks, “Wittgenstein's untiring endeavor [is] to relegate mental images to a merely secondary place.” He determinedly rejected the traditional empiricist view that thinking is primarily a play of images, that language is semantically grounded in imagery, and that the principal role of language is to communicate the results of our inner, imaginal thought processes to others. Instead, Wittgenstein regarded language itself as the preeminent vehicle of thought, and he held that the meanings of linguistic expressions arise from the various uses to which they are put. He thus saw no need (and no room) for language to be semantically grounded in any other form of representation. In support of this position, he strove to show that imagery (the only real candidate for the job) could not possibly be the semantic ground of language, and he is very widely believed to have succeeded.

The two themes of the cognitive unimportance of imagery and its non-pictorial nature were taken up, and argued more fully, by numerous post-Wittgensteinian philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although there may be some tension between the themes (most arguments against the imagery theory of thought and meaning seem to turn upon mental images being, in some sense, picture-like) in practice they have rarely, if ever, come into conflict; rather, both have played their part in setting the iconophobic tone of the era.

Even in the wake of the revival of scientific interest in the cognitive roles of imagery in the 1960s and 70s, the handful of post-Wittgensteinian philosophers who have attempted to defend imagery-based theories of thought and meaning (Price, 1953; Lowe, 1995, 1996; Ellis, 1995; Nyíri, 2001) still find themselves swimming very much against the tide. Philosophers such as Harrison (1962–3), Goodman (1968), and Fodor (1975) have reinforced, restated and extended Wittgenstein's arguments for the irrelevance of imagery to semantics, and have made a powerful and influential case. One point that is often made is that there seems to be no natural way of representing certain linguistically expressible concepts in an image. Logical relations are often mentioned in this context. It is hard to see, for example, how it might be possible to form a mental image of not (is any image in which John does not appear an image of John is not here?), or or (how would an image of A or B differ from one of A and B?), or if…then (see Barsalou (1999) for some tentative suggestions in rebuttal).

The image theory of linguistic meaning might seem to be on its strongest ground when it is applied to nouns (or, at least, concrete nouns). On the face of things, it is plausible to think that one understands the meaning of the word 'dog' if and only if as the word is able to arouse an image of a dog in one's mind. Berkeley's argument against general ideas had long brought this simple picture into question, however (see section 2.3.3). Can my mental picture of a dog represent any dog, or dogs in general, or is it, at best, just a representation of Rover?

Twentieth century philosophers, however, would soon point to an even deeper problem. They assumed, probably often correctly, that the traditional image theory of meaning was based upon the assumption that images themselves get their meaning through resembling their objects: an image of a dog represents a dog because it resembles or looks like a dog, in the same way that a painting of Queen Elizabeth represents Queen Elizabeth because it looks like her. This resemblance theory of representation is not always explicitly stated by image theorists of thought and language (perhaps it is thought to be too obvious to be worth saying, or perhaps not all of them are really committed to it), but Russell (1919,1921), for one, explicitly takes the view that words represent because they are associated with mental images, and that the images themselves represent because they resemble their objects.

This resemblance theory became the main focus of attack. Consider a photograph of Leo the lion. It would certainly be reasonable to say both that it resembles and that it represents him. But now suppose we have two such photographs. Each photo resembles the other more than either resemble Leo (both photos are small, rectangular pieces of card, with a white border around a gray or vari-colored rectangle, and neither is carnivorous or furry), yet we would normally want to say that they each represent Leo, and not that they represent each other. Of course, a photograph of Leo does resemble him, when the right aspects of resemblance are considered, but in this regard Leo equally resembles the photograph. We are unlikely, however, to want to say that he represents the photo. Resemblance is a symmetrical relationship, and representation is not. None of this necessarily means that resemblance never plays any role in representation, but in order for it to do so, the relevant aspects of resemblance have to be recognized, and the resembling object has to be used (or, at least, taken) as a representation. But surely, before a cognitive system can recognize or use the relevant aspects of resemblance between a photograph (or an inner quasi-picture) and an object (or a percept), it must already be able to represent the picture and its object, and their various features, to itself. The mind's power to recognize resemblance seemingly depends on its power to represent things, rather than vice-versa. On grounds such as this, Goodman (1968) argued that even physical pictures – paintings drawings, photographs, etc. – do not represent their subjects because they resemble them. Indeed, he held that what a picture represents is just as much a matter of interpretation and convention as is what a word or sentence represents, the implication being that pictorial representation is no more “natural” or fundamental, no more a “ground” for meaning, than linguistic representation itself. Clearly the argument applies to mental pictures quite as much as to physical ones.

Fodor (1975), borrowing liberally from the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (1953 §139 f.), made a compelling case that mental pictures cannot be the foundational bearers of intentionality because what they resemble is too indeterminate (cf. Goodman, 1970). A mental image of John, who is a tall fat man, might mean John, it might mean fat man (or John is a fat man), or tall man, or just man, human being, or even physical object. On the other hand it might mean John in just the particular pose and situation in which he is imagined. After all, it resembles all those things (and indefinitely many more). What an image means, according to Fodor, what it is an image of, will necessarily remain radically indeterminate unless it is pinned down by an associated linguistic description. Fodor himself holds that what our mental images represent is determined by an associated description couched in mentalese, an innate, unconscious, computational “language of thought” (Fodor, 1975) (see: language of thought hypothesis); others, such as Kaufmann (1980), apparently think that the necessary descriptions may be couched in the natural language that the imager speaks. On either view, though, the traditional semantic dependency is inverted. Instead of the meaningfulness of language being grounded in imagery, the meaningfulness of imagery seems to need grounding in some sort of language.

Arguments against the pictorial nature of imagery, which are scarcely more than hinted at in Wittgenstein's published works, were developed much more explicitly by Ryle (1949). As part of a broader (and very influential) attack on what he called “Descartes' myth” (i.e., Cartesian dualism), Ryle argued that the notion of private, non-physical, mental pictures is an absurdity, and proposed instead that “imagining”, “seeing in the mind's eye”, and so forth, is better understood as akin to pretending (to ourselves) to experience ordinary, external things. Other philosophers influenced by both Wittgenstein and Ryle soon carried forward this critique of the inner picture: Shorter (1952) and Dennett (1969) (in some respects anticipating the work of Pylyshyn (1973) – see section 4.4.1 below, and especially note 31) suggested that imagery might be more akin to describing or depicting something to oneself, rather than to pretending to see it; and, from a detailed exegesis of Ryle's arguments, Ishiguro (1966, 1967) developed a theory of mental images as intentional objects (in the sense of Anscombe (1965)) having a merely “grammatical” existence: Although the grammar of our language may sometimes make it very awkward to refer to our imagery experiences without seeming to imply that they are caused by certain entities (mental images), it does not follow that such entities actually exist.

Although expressed in very different terms, Ishiguro's position on imagery is not altogether unlike the view developed earlier in the century by Sartre (1940). (See Ryle (1971) for an interesting comparison of his own views about the mental, including mental imagery, to views in the phenomenological tradition, to which Sartre belonged.) Under the influence of Husserl rather than Wittgenstein, Sartre also stressed the intentionality of imagery and denied that mental images (conceived as entities) exist:

The fact of the matter is that the expression ‘mental image’ is confusing. … But since the word image is of long standing we cannot reject it completely. However, in order to avoid all ambiguity, we must repeat at this point that an image is nothing else than a relationship. The imaginative consciousness I have of Peter is not a consciousness of an image of Peter: Peter is directly reached, my attention is not directed on an image but on an object (Sartre, 1940 p. 8).

It is important to be clear that just because Sartre (and Ryle, Shorter, Ishiguro, and others) hold that mental images are not inner pictures, nor even, indeed, any sort of entity, they are not thereby denying that people have quasi-perceptual experiences, or even that these may sometimes be very vivid. Unfortunately, perhaps because the notion that such experiences are caused by inner pictures is so entrenched in our folk psychology, this point does not always seem to have been clear to critics of such views, and it has even been occasionally suggested that they could not possibly be held by anyone personally familiar with the experience of imagery.[21] However, a careful reading of these apparently iconophobic authors soon reveals that they in no way intend to deny the experiential reality of imagery, and most of them make their personal familiarity with it quite clear.[22] They deny only that such experience, however vivid it might be, is caused by (or embodied as) inner pictures.

By contrast, in his Mental Images – A Defence, Hannay (1971) vigorously championed the reality of inner pictures (see also Hannay, 1973, and for a counterargument see Candlish, 1975). But, despite the fact that he had no thought of reinstating imagery to its traditional importance in cognitive and semantic theory, Hannay clearly saw himself (in 1971) as a lonely dissenter, a voice crying in the wilderness against philosophy's virtually monolithic iconophobic consensus. In the subsequent decades that consensus has been fractured, but by no means shattered, by developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (discussed below). In particular, in the wake of Kosslyn's (1980, 1994) seminal work on the cognitive psychology of imagery, a growing number of philosophers are now ready to defend the reality of mental pictures, and show no sign whatsoever of feeling embattled (e.g., von Eckardt, 1988, 1993; Tye, 1988, 1991; Mortensen, 1989; Brann, 1991; Cohen, 1996; Rollins, 2001). Many other philosophers, even if not entirely convinced about pictures, now take a serious interest in the cognitive science of imagery.

Nonetheless, the post-Wittgensteinian consensus that imagery cannot be as important as it once seemed to be, that it cannot be the ground of linguistic meaning or the prime vehicle of thought, remains strong. Furthermore, Bennett & Hacker (2003) have recently made a powerful restatement of the Wittgensteinian case against mental entities in general and mental pictures in particular. Despite all that has happened in cognitive science, imagery has by no means regained its former prominence in philosophy.

4. Imagery in Cognitive Science

A revival of interest in imagery was an important component of the so called cognitive revolution in psychology during the 1960s and early 1970s, a period when the Behaviorist intellectual hegemony over the field was broken and the concept of mental representation was established as central and vital to psychological theorizing (Baars, 1986; Gardner, 1987; but see also Leahey, 1992). The first (and formative) textbook of the emerging cognitive approach to psychology (Neisser, 1967) devoted substantial space to mental imagery, and the end of the 1960s brought the publication of a spate of books reviewing and reporting new findings on the psychology of imagery: Richardson (1969), Horowitz (1970), Paivio (1971), Piaget & Inhelder (1971), Segal (1971a), Sheehan (1972).

Although the emergence of computational models of mental processes probably played the leading role in the rise of cognitive psychology and cognitive science, the new interest in imagery was independently motivated, and contributed significantly to the growing feeling, amongst psychologists, that both the ontology and methodology of Behaviorism were excessively restrictive, and that inner mental processes and representations could, after all, be useful, or even indispensible, scientific concepts. Quite apart from the broader talk of revolution in psychology in this era (e.g., Hebb, 1960), there seems to have been a real sense, at the time, that the revival of interest in imagery was, in itself, an insurgent movement liberating psychologists from entrenched but outworn Behaviorist dogmas. The imagery revival was depicted in dramatic terms as “the return of the ostracized” (Holt, 1964; cf. Haber, 1970), as “a dimension of mind rediscovered” (Kessell, 1972), and as marking “a paradigm shift in psychology” (Neisser, 1972b).

4.1 The Imagery Revival

Holt (1964) indicates a number of developments that began to lead some psychologists, in the 1950s, to begin to pay significant attention to imagery again. These include research on hallucinogenic drugs, developments in electroencephalography, the discovery of REM sleep and its correlation with dreaming, and Penfield's (1958) finding that direct electrical stimulation of certain brain areas can give rise to vivid memory (or pseudo-memory) imagery. More significant, however, (according to Holt) was a line of psychological research that was originally inspired by practical, rather than theoretical, concerns: by the perceptual problems experienced by people such as radar operators, long-distance truck drivers, and jet pilots, whose work requires them to remain perceptually alert whilst watching monotonous, impoverished, and barely changing visual stimuli over extended periods of time. In the laboratory, subjects experiencing such sensory deprivation often spontaneously reported vivid, intrusive, and sometimes bizarre mental imagery, “like having a dream while awake” (Bexton, Heron, & Scott, 1954; but see Suedfeld & Coren, 1989). Despite the introspective nature of the evidence, the practical implications of these findings (for such things as road and air safety) made them hard to dismiss.

Beginning in the 1960s, and perhaps stimulated by some of the research mentioned by Holt, there was also a growing interest in the application of imagery based techniques in psychotherapy and psychosomatic medicine (see, e.g., Assagioli, 1965; Horowitz, 1970, 1983; Korn & Johnson, 1983; Sheikh, 2003). By the 1970s, something of a self conscious imagery movement had taken hold, in which discoveries and theoretical developments coming out of experimental psychology and cognitive science helped to fuel and legitimate an enthusiasm for the application of imagery to psychotherapy, and even to “personal growth,” “consciousness expansion,” and the like. More recently, imagery based techniques, including, but not limited to, so called “mental practice” (Richardson, 1967; Ryan & Simons, 1982; Nordin et al., 2006), have come to be extensively applied in sports psychology, where they are widely believed to have the potential to boost athletic performance to a significant degree (Paivio, 1985; Sheikh & Korn, 1994; Driskell et al., 1994; Morris et al., 2005; Short et al., 2006; Weinberg, 2008). A journal dedicated to the subject, the Journal of Imagery Research in Sport and Physical Activity commenced online publication in 2006. Great claims are also made, by some, for the healing powers of guided imagery, whereby clients (or patients) are encouraged to visualize particular scenes or scenarios thought to have therapeutic value (e.g., Rossman, 2000). Guided imagery techniques have been claimed to be effective for purposes ranging from chronic pain relief and the preparation of patients for surgery (Fontaine, 2000; Tusek et al., 1997), to breast enlargement and global spiritual renewal (Willard, 1977; Ekstein, 2001)!

It is sometimes claimed or implied that these sorts of techniques are based upon ancient oriental, and particularly Indian, spiritual practices (e.g., Samuels & Samuels, 1975; Gawain, 1982), and it thus may not be coincidental that a prominent figure in the psychotherapeutic imagery movement is a Pakistani born psychologist, Akhter Ahsen, known not only for his clinical and theoretical work (e.g., Ahsen, 1965, 1977, 1984, 1985, 1993, 1999), but also because he was instrumental, in the later 1970s, in the foundation of the International Imagery Association, and the peer reviewed Journal of Mental Imagery (which began publication in 1977). The Association's mission, stated on their web site, is “to further the understanding of mental imagery and advance its potential in the development of human consciousness” (see Other Internet Resources). The journal publishes articles on imagery from a wide range of psychological perspectives, including the cognitive. An American Association for the Study of Mental Imagery was also founded in 1978, with a mission to promote “the study of mental imagery as a part of human science and the application of scientific knowledge about mental imagery in the relief of human suffering and the enhancement of personal development”. Its journal, Imagination, Cognition and Personality, commenced publication in the early 1980s. (The Association may now be defunct — its web site has disappeared — but the journal continues to be published.)

4.2 Mnemonic Effects of Imagery

This archive is maintained by J. P. E. Harper-Scott. The abstracts relate both to completed dissertations and to those in progress. We would be glad to add further abstracts: please fill in this form. Abstracts for ethnomusicological dissertations are sought both here and by Ethnomusicology Online: see details at the foot of this page, also for other sources of information on the Web about dissertations and abstracts.

  1. Abel, Jürg Michael, Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, 1996: Die Entstehung der sinfonischen Musik in Rußland
  2. Abravaya, Ido, University of Tel Aviv, 2000: Studies of Rhythm and Tempo in the Music of J. S. Bach
  3. Adlington, Robert C., University of Sussex, 1997: Temporality in Post-Tonal Music
  4. Appelt, Carol R., Monash University, Victoria, Australia, expected 1997: Ockeghem’s Masses as a View of Modal Practice Using the Theory of Tinctoris as a Measure of Comparison
  5. Attinello, Paul Gregory, University of California, Los Angeles, 1997: The Interpretation of Chaos: A Critical Analysis of Meaning in European Avant-Garde Vocal Music, 1958-68
  6. Atwell, Scott D., Michigan State University, expected 1999: Cadence, Linear Procedures, and Pitch Structure in the Works of Johannes Ockeghem
  7. Barker, Naomi Joy, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1995: Analytical Issues in the Toccatas of Girolamo Frescobaldi
  8. Bhogal, Gurminder Kaur, University of Chicago, 2004: Arabesque and Metric Dissonance in the Music of Maurice Ravel (1905-1914)
  9. Blachly, Alexander, Columbia University, 1995: Mensuration and Tempo in 15th-Century Music: Cut Signatures in Theory and Practice
  10. Bower, Bruno, Royal College of Music, in progress (projected finish 2015): The Crystal Palace Saturday Concerts, 1856-1878: A Case Study of Nineteenth-Century Analytical Programme Notes
  11. Brover-Lubovsky, Bella, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2001: Vivaldi’s Harmony: Practice and Theory
  12. Bruno, Luca, University of Trento, Italy, 2006: Theory and Analysis of Harmony in Adrian Willaert’s Canzone villanesche alla napolitana (1542-1545)
  13. Buhagiar, Spiridion Vincent, Mediterranean Institute, University of Malta, Msida, Malta, 1999: Francesco Azopardi (1748-1809): A Maltese Classical Composer, Theorist, and Teacher
  14. Bunbury, Richard R., University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2001: Justine Ward and the Genesis of the Ward Method of Music Education
  15. Burns, Ellen J., Florida State University, 1994: The Dialectical Structure of W. A. Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte: A Phenomenological Analysis
  16. Burns, Kristine H., Ball State University, 1993: The History and Development of Algorithms in Music Composition, 1957-1993
  17. Carpenter, Russell K., University of San Francisco, 1996: Effects of Listening for Key Components in Jazz Pieces: The First Study of Cone’s Theory of Ideal Hearing
  18. Champagne, Mario Joseph Serge Gerard, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1994: The French Song Cycle (1840-1924) with Special Emphasis on the Works of Gabriel Fauré
  19. Chapman, Clive Gilbert, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1981: English Pantomime and its Music, 1700-1730
  20. Chen, Beth Pei-Fen, University of Manchester, 2009: The Development of Mozart’s Slurring and its Possible Functions in Performance
  21. Chiarelli, Francesca, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1995: “Il Lume Rinchiuso” (The Poetics of the Seconda Prattica): Monteverdi’s Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Books of Madrigals
  22. Chrissochoidis, Ilias, Stanford University, 2004: Early Reception of Handel’s Oratorios, 1732-1784: Narrative-Studies-Documents
  23. Clark, Alice V., Princeton University, 1996: Concordare cum materia: The Tenor in the Fourteenth-Century Motet
  24. Clements, James, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2002: Aspects of the Ars Rhetorica in the Violin Music of Heinrich Biber (1644-1704)
  25. Cochran, Keith Harris, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995: The Genesis of Gaspare Spontini’s Agnes von Hohenstaufen: A Chapter in the History of German Opera
  26. Coleman, Jeremy, Kings College London, 2016: Wagner in Paris: Translation, Identity, Modernity
  27. Corte-Real, Maria de Sao Jose, Columbia University, 2001: Cultural Policy and Musical Expression in Lisbon in the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy (1960s-1980s)
  28. Corte-Real Carvalho, Maria de Sao Jose, Columbia University, 1991: Retention of Musical Models: Fado Performance among Portuguese Migrants in New York
  29. Curry, Robert Michael, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 2003: Fragments of ars antiqua Music at Stary Sacz and the Evolution of the Clarist Order in Central Europe in the Thirteenth Century
  30. Dairianathan, Eugene I., Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 1996: Change Articulated by Pitch: A Study of Instrumental Works by Franz Schubert and John Coolidge Adams
  31. Daniels, Jonelle, Royal Holloway, University of London, in progress: The Interaction of Words and Music in the Shakespeare settings of Peter Warlock (Philip Heseltine): Writer/Composer; Score/Performance
  32. Dell’Antonio, Andrew, University of California, Berkeley, 1991: Syntax, Form, and Genre in Sonatas and Canzonas, 1621-1635
  33. Dexter, Keri John, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000: The Provision of Choral Music at St George’s Chapel, Windsor Castle, and Eton College, c.1640-1733
  34. Dickenson, James W., University of Salford, 2003: The Impact of Norwegian Folk Music on Norwegian Jazz, 1945-1995
  35. Dixon, Gavin, Goldsmiths College, University of London, expected 2006: Polystylism as Dialogue: A Bakhtinian Interpretation of Schnittke’s Symphonies 3, 4, and his Concerto Grosso No. 4/Symphony No. 5
  36. Doctor, Jennifer R., Northwestern University, 1993: The BBC and the Ultra-modern Problem: A Documentary Study of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s Dissemination of Second Viennese School Repertory, 1922-36
  37. Dodds, Michael R., University of Rochester, 1999: The Baroque Church Tones in Theory and Practice
  38. Dolenko, Elena, Moscow State Tchaikovsky Conservatory, Moscow, 2003: Schoenberg: The Early Years [Molodoy Schoenberg]
  39. Dromey, Christopher, King’s College London, 2011: The Pierrot Ensembles.
  40. DuJunco, Mercedes M., University of Washington, 1994: Tugging at the Native’s Heartstrings: Nostalgia and the Post-Mao “Revival” of the Xian Shi Yue String Ensemble Music of Chaozhou, South China
  41. Earle, Eugenia, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1979: Improvised Ornamentation in Solo Instrumental Literature of the German Late Baroque: A Study and Lecture Demonstration
  42. Ellis, Sam, University of Wales, Bangor, 2006: Evolution and Retrospection in the Chamber Music of Arthur Bliss
  43. Elsdon, Peter S., University of Southampton, 2001: Keith Jarrett’s Solo Concerts and the Aesthetics of Free Improvisation, 1960-1973
  44. Enge, Håvard, Music Reading Poetry – Hans Zender’s Musical Reception of Hölderlin
  45. Erdahl, Rolf Christian, The Peabody Institute of The Johns Hopkins University, 1994: Edvard Grieg’s Sonatas for Stringed Instrument and Piano: Performance Implications of the Primary Source Materials
  46. Fedorovskaya, Natalya, Far-Eastern State Technical University (Russia), 2003: The Role of Rhetoric in the Russian Culture of Spiritual Singing in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (by the Example of a Repentance Theme)
  47. Filkins, Joanne M., University of Kentucky, 1994: The Horn Music of Bernhard Heiden
  48. Fink, Robert Wallace, University of California, Berkeley, 1994: Arrows of Desire: Long-Range Linear Structure and the Transformation of Musical Energy
  49. Finney, Ian James, Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London, 1988: The String Quartets of Vagn Holmboe
  50. Flamm, Christoph, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 1995: Der russische Komponist Nikolaj Metner: Studien und Materialien
  51. Fleming, Bonnie E., University of Kansas, 1998: Chamber Music for Single Instrument and Piano by Sir Charles Hubert Hastings Parry (1848-1918)
  52. Fleming, Michael, The Open University (Milton Keynes, UK), 2001: Viol-Making in England c1580-1660
  53. Franklin, John Curtis, University of London, University College, forthcoming (expected 2002): Terpander: the Invention of Music in the Orientalizing Period
  54. Freis, Wolfgang, University of Chicago, 1992: Cristóbal de Morales and the Spanish Motet in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century: An Analytical Study of Selected Motets by Morales and Competitive Settings in SEV-BC 1 and TARAZ-C 2-3
  55. Friedmann, Susana, King’s College, University of London, 1996: The Festive Song Repertory of the Barbacoas, Colombia, and its Implications for Ballad Transmission
  56. Fuhrmann, Wolfgang, University of Vienna, expected 2001: “Miserere mei”: Studien zur Geschichte musikalischer Subjektivität (“Miserere mei: Studies on the History of Musical Subjectivity)
  57. Fulias, Ioannis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2005: Slow Movements in Sonata Forms in the Classic Era: A Contribution to the Evolution of Genres and Structural Types through the Works of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven
  58. Gallo, Denise P., The Catholic University of America, 1997: Giovanni Pacini’s “Giuditta”: The Dramatic Possibilities of the Oratorio
  59. Gardner, Matthew, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg, 2007: Handel and Maurice Greene’s Circle at the Apollo Academy: the Music and Intellectual Contexts of Oratorios, Odes and Masques
  60. Gasche, David, Université François Rabelais, Tours, France, Wien Universität, Wien, Austria, 2009: La musique de circonstance pour Harmoniemusik à Vienne (1760-1820)
  61. Giannopoulos, Ilias, University of Athens, 2011:  Aspects of time in the music of the 20th century: On the problem of time and its theoretical presuppositions in new music with special emphasis on the music of the avant-garde of the 1950s and 1960s
  62. Gibson, Lorna A. C., Royal Holloway, University of London, 2005: Beyond Jerusalem: Music in the Women’s Institute, 1919-1969
  63. Gibson, Robert Raphael, University of Oxford, 2004: Parody Lost and Regained: Richard Strauss’s Double Voices
  64. Gillespie, Joseph Norman, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1982: The Life and Work of Henry Carey (1687-1743)
  65. Goldenberg, Yosef, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2001: Prolongation of Seventh Chords in Tonal Music
  66. Goldsmith, Melissa Ursula Dawn, Louisiana State University, 2001: Alban Berg’s Filmic Music: Intentions and Extensions of the Film Music Interlude in the Opera Lulu
  67. González-Castelao, Juan, Universidad de Oviedo, 2007: El Director Ataúlfo Argenta (1913-1958): Estudio Biográfico, Analítico E Interpretativo
  68. Goodman, Elaine Claire, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000: Analysing the Ensemble in Music Rehearsal and Performance: The Nature and Effects of Interaction in Cello-Piano Duos
  69. Green, Rebecca, University of Toronto, 1995: Power and Patriarchy in Haydn’s Goldoni Operas
  70. Green, Shannon L., University of Wisconsin-Madison, expected 1997: “Sing and You’ll Be Good”: Music at Hull-House and other Social Settlement Houses
  71. Gresser, Clemens, University of Southampton, 2004: (Re-)Defining the Relationships between Composer, Performer and Listener: Earle Brown, John Cage, Morton Feldman and Christian Wolff
  72. Grogan, Christopher Philip, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1989: Aspects of Elgar’s Creative Process in The Apostles (op. 42), with Particular Reference to Scene ii — “By the Wayside”
  73. Gunderson, Terence S., University of Northern Colorado, 1992: A Pedagogical Approach to Solo Jazz Vibraphone developed through an Analysis of Common Performance Practice
  74. Gustavson, Royston Robert, University of Melbourne, 1998: Hans Ott, Hieronymus Formschneider, and the Novum et insigne opus musicum (Nuremberg, 1537-1538)
  75. Hafner, Everett, University of Massachusetts, Amherst: Time Divided: Invariance of Proportion in Orchestral Performance
  76. Halsell, George Kay, The University of Texas at Austin, 1989: North Italian Sacred Ensemble Music of the First Third of the Seventeenth Century calling for Participation by One or More Trombones: An Annotated Anthology with Historical Introduction and Commentary
  77. Harley, Maria Anna, McGill University, Montréal, 1994: Space and Spatialization in Contemporary Music: History and Analysis, Ideas and Implementations
  78. Haste, Amanda, Bristol University, 2008: The Role of Music in Twenty-First-Century Anglican Monasticism
  79. Hebbert, Ben, University of Oxford (St Cross College), in progress: The English Music Trade, c.1647–c.1725
  80. Heller, Wendy, Brandeis University, 1995: Chastity, Heroism, and Allure: Women in the Opera of Seventeenth-Century Venice
  81. Hernández Mateos, Alberto, University of Salamanca, 2012: El Pensamiento Musical De Antonio Eximeno (Antonio Eximeno’s Musical Thought)
  82. Herzog, Silvia, University of Southern California, 1996: Strophic Discourse and Stefano Landi’s La morte d’Orfeo: Syntax in Music and Poetry During the cinquecento and seicento
  83. Hibberd, Kristian Philip Gordon, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2005: Shostakovich and Bakhtin: A Critical Investigation of the Late Works (1974-1975)
  84. Hornby, Emma, Oxford University, 1998: A Study of the Eighth-Mode Tracts in the Gregorian and Old Roman Traditions
  85. Hoyt, Trevor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in progress: The Genesis of Beethoven’s String Quartet in E-Flat Major, Op. 127
  86. Hübner, Falk, University Leiden, 2013: Shifting Identities. The Musician as Theatrical Performer
  87. Hundsnes, Svein, University of Oslo, 2014: Thematic Counterpoint And Adjacent Constructional Texturing In Tchaikovsky’s Six Symphonies
  88. James, Kenneth Edward, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1987: Concert Life in Eighteenth-Century Bath
  89. Jensen, Karen Marjorie, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1981: A Study of Extended Vocal Techniques with Particular Reference to Practical and Compositional Usage since 1972
  90. Jones, Tristan David, University of Birmingham, 2000: Passions in Perspective: An Analytical Discussion of the Three Passion Settings of Heinrich Schütz (1585-1672) against their Historical and Stylistic Backgrounds
  91. Kardamis, Konstantinos, Ionian University, 2006: The “Pre-Solomian” Nikolaos Halikiopoulos Mantzaros and his Work
  92. Kertz-Welzel, Alexandra, Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, 2001: Die Transzendenz der Gefühle: Beziehungen zwischen Musik und Gefühl bei Wackenroder/Tieck und die Musikästhetik der Romantik
  93. Key, Susan, University of Maryland at College Park: “Sweet Melody Over Silent Wave”: Depression-Era Radio and the American Composer
  94. King, Jonathan, Oxford University, 1996: Texting in Early Fifteenth-Century Sacred Polyphony
  95. Kisby, Fiona, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1996: The Early-Tudor Royal Household Chapel in London, 1485-1547
  96. Konov, Yavor, State Academy of Music “Pancho Vladigerov”, Sofia, 1997: The first harpsichord treatise “Les Principes du Clavecin” by Saint Lambert (Paris, 1702)
  97. Konye, Paul, University of Kentucky, 1997: Twentieth-Century Nigerian Art Music: Social, Political, and Cultural Factors Involved in its Evolution and Practice
  98. Korstvedt, Benjamin Marcus, University of Pennsylvania, 1995: The First Edition of Anton Bruckner’s Fourth Symphony: Authorship, Production and Reception
  99. Kuehn, Frank Michael Carlos, Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), 2004: Antonio Carlos Jobim, a Sinfonia do Rio de Janeiro e a Bossa Nova: caminho para a construção de uma nova linguagem musical [Antonio Carlos Jobim, the Symphony of Rio de Janeiro and the Bossa Nova: the Path to the Construction of a New Musical Language]
  100. Kulezic-Wilson, Danijela, University of Ulster, 2005: Composing on Screen: The Musicality of Film
  101. Lee, Carolyn Ruby, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1980: Spanish Polyphonic Song c. 1460 to 1535
  102. Lee-De Amici, Beth Anne, University of Pennsylvania, in progress (expected June 1999): “Ad Sustentacionem Fidei Christiani”: Sacred Music and Ceremony in Medieval Oxford
  103. LeGuin, Elisabeth, University of California, Berkeley, 1997: “As My Works Show Me to Be”: Physicality as Compositional Technique in the Instrumental Music of Luigi Boccherini
  104. Lehr, Hartwig, Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst, Frankfurt am Main, 1995: Musik für … : Untersuchungen zum Werk Rudi Stephans
  105. Lerch, Alexander, Technische Universität Berlin, 2008: Software-Based Extraction of Objective Parameters from Music Performances
  106. Leven-Keesen, Kathrin, Georg-August Universität Göttingen, 1996: Robert Schumanns “Szenen aus Goethes Faust” (WoO 3): Studien zu Frühfassungen anhand des Autographs Wiede 11/3
  107. Levidou, Ekaterini, University of Oxford, 2008: The Encounter of Neoclassicism with Eurasianism in Interwar Paris: Stravinsky, Suvchinsky, and Lourié
  108. Lloyd, Angela, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1996: Modal Representation in the Early Madrigals of Cipriano de Rore
  109. Lloyd, Catherine, King’s College, London, 2002: Ars Antiqua — Ars Nova
  110. Lloyd, Richard G. C., Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000: Provision for Music in the Parish Church in Late-Medieval London
  111. Lundberg, Mattias, The University of Liverpool, in progress (expected 2005): The Tonus Peregrinus in the Polyphony of the Western Church
  112. Lynan, Peter R., Oxford University (St Edmund Hall), 1997: The English Keyboard Concerto in the Eighteenth Century
  113. Mabary, Judith Ann, Washington University – St Louis, 1999: Redefining Melodrama: The Czech Response to Music and Word
  114. McClatchie, Stephen C., University of Western Ontario, 1994: Alfred Lorenz as Theorist and Analyst
  115. McClellen, Michael Edward, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1994: Battling Over the Lyric Muse: Expressions of Revolution and Counterrevolution at the Théâtre Feydeau, 1789-1801
  116. McClung, Bruce D., Eastman School of Music, 1995: American Dreams: Analyzing Moss Hart, Ira Gershwin, and Kurt Weill’s Lady in the Dark
  117. Dr Louise McInnes, University of Huddersfield, 2014: The Social, Political and Religious Contexts of the Late Medieval Carol: 1360-1
  118. Mackay, Lisa, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, expected 1998: The Salve Regina Settings in the Eton College Choirbook
  119. Maiani, Brad, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1996: The Responsory-Communions: Toward a Chronology of Selected Proper Chants
  120. Manning, David, Cardiff University, 2003: Harmony, Tonality and Structure in Vaughan Williams’s Music
  121. Marín, Miguel Ángel, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1999: Music and Musicians in Provincial Towns: The Case of Eighteenth-Century Jaca (Spain)
  122. Marrington, Mark D., University of Leeds, 2002: Extra-Musical Influences and Musical Style in the Works of Denis ApIvor
  123. Marsh, Malcolm Herbert, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1983: The Turn of the Screw: Britten’s and Piper’s Operatic Fulfilment of Henry James’s Novella
  124. Matsumoto, Naomi, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2005: The Origins of the Operatic Mad Scene and its Early Development up to c1700
  125. Matveyeva, Elena, Moscow State Conservatoire, 2000: Joseph Haydn’s Musical Theatre
  126. Mehrens, Christopher E., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in progress: From Wonderland to Poictesme: The Antimodernism of Deems Taylor
  127. Mirchandani, Sharon, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1997: Ruth Crawford Seeger’s Five Songs, Suite No. 2, and Three Chants: Representations of America and Explorations of Spirituality
  128. Mitsopoulou, Evangelia I., University of Macedonia of Thessaloniki, 2010: Dante as Source of Inspiration for Franz Liszt: Dante Symphony and Its Pianistic Transcriptions.
  129. Muir, Theresa, City University of New York, 1997: Wagner in England: Four Writers before Shaw
  130. Naude, Janet J., University of Cape Town, 1997: Lulu, Child of Wozzeck and Marie: Towards an Understanding of Alban Berg, “Master of the Smallest Link”, through his Vocal and Dramatic Music
  131. Nelson, Mark D., Princeton University, 1995: Quieting the Mind, Manifesting Mind: the Zen Buddhist Roots of John Cage’s Early Chance-Determined and Indeterminate Compositions
  132. Nelson, Thomas K., University of Minnesota, 1998: The Fantasy of Absolute Music
  133. Nivans, David, University of California, Los Angeles, 1992: Brahms and the Binary Sonata: A Structuralist Interpretation
  134. Nosow, Robert Michael, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992: The Florid and Equal-Discantus Motet Styles of Fifteenth-Century Italy
  135. Novak, John K., University of Texas at Austin, 1994: The Programmatic Orchestral Works of Leos Janacek: Their Style and their Musical and Extramusical Content
  136. Oelmann, Klaus Henning, Gesamthochschule/Universität Kassel, 1992: Edvard Grieg: Versuch einer Orientierung
  137. O’Shea, Patrick Michael, Arizona State University, 1995: A Stylistic and Structural Analysis of Russell Woollen’s “La Corona”
  138. Owens, Samantha K., Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1995: The Württemberg Hofkapelle c.1680-1721
  139. Paget, Laurie, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1995: The Madrigals of Marc’Antonio Ingegneri
  140. Pakusa, Peter, Universität Hamburg, 1991: Jenseits der zwölf Töne: Untersuchungen an neuerer Vokalmusik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Vierteltonkompositionen
  141. Palombini, Carlos, University of Durham, 1993: Pierre Schaeffer’s Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects
  142. Parmley, Andrew Charles, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1988: The Pastorales, Intermèdes, and Incidental Music of Marc-Antoine Charpentier
  143. Parsons, James, University of North Texas, 1992: Ode to the Ninth: the Poetic and Musical Tradition Behind the Finale of Beethoven’s Choral Symphony
  144. Paulinyi, Zoltan, (Masters degree) Departamento de Música, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2010: Flausino Vale and Marcos Salles: influences of Franco-Belgian School on Brazilian works for solo violin
  145. Pearson, Ingrid Elizabeth, University of Sheffield, 2001: Clarinet Embouchure in Theory and Practice: The Forgotten Art of Reed-Above
  146. Pederson, Sanna, University of Pennsylvania, 1995: Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800-1850
  147. Peraino, Judith Ann, University of California, Berkeley, 1995: New Music, Notions of Genre, and the “Manuscrit du Roi” circa 1300
  148. Perry, Susan Cotton, University of Kentucky, 1990: The Development of the Italian Organ Toccata: 1550-1750
  149. Pinegar, Sandra, Columbia University, 1991: Textual and Conceptual Relationships Among Theoretical Writings on Measurable Music during the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries
  150. Pocock, Peter G., University of Southern California, 1996: The Choral Music of Hugo Wolf: A Discussion of the Musical and Textual Relationships with Performance Editions for Male Chorus
  151. Potter, Caroline, University of Liverpool, 1995: A la recherche d’Henri Dutilleux
  152. Sarah Potter, University of Leeds, 2014: Changing Vocal Style & Technique in Britain, 1750–1900 (The Role of the Singer in Historically Informed Performance)
  153. Powers, Doris Bosworth, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995: Johann Nikolaus Forkel’s Philosophy of Music in the Einleitung to Volume One of His Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik (1788): A Translation and Commentary with a Glossary of Eighteenth-Century Terms
  154. Press, Stephen, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in progress: Prokofiev’s Ballets for Diaghilev
  155. Ramanna, Nishlyn, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2005: Jazz as Discourse: A Contextualised Account of Contemporary Jazz in Post-Apartheid Durban and Johannesburg
  156. Ratcliffe, Martin, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1998: Robert Simpson’s Third Symphony: Sources and Influences
  157. Raub, Jennifer, Royal Holloway, University of London, in progress: “Sarum” Liturgical Printing in Tudor London: A Study and Catalogue
  158. Rawson, Robert G., Royal Holloway, University of London, 2002: From Olomouc to London: The Early Music of Gottfried Finger (c 1655-1730)
  159. Reeve, Robert Gilbert, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1980: The Life and Works of William Mundy
  160. Reid, Stefan, Royal Holloway, University of London, in progress: The Art of Good Practice: Analysis of Effective Rehearsal and its Role in Individual Musical Development
  161. Reinhardt, Lauriejean, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995: From Poet’s Voice to Composer’s Muse: Text and Music in Webern’s Jone Settings
  162. Reuter, Christoph, Universität Köln, 1996: Die auditive Diskrimination von Orchesterinstrumenten
  163. Reyland, Nicholas W., Cardiff University of Wales, 2005: “Akcja” and Narrativity in the Music of Witold Lutoslawski
  164. Ridding, Josepha, University of Kingston (UK), 2003: Cultural Considerations of Rubato in Czech Piano Performance, with Specific Reference to Chopin’s Works
  165. Ridgewell, Rupert M., Royal Holloway, University of London, 1999: Mozart and the Artaria Publishing House: Studies in the Inventory Ledgers, 1784-1793
  166. Riley, Matthew, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000: Attentive Listening: The Concept of Aufmerksamkeit and its Significance in German Musical Thought, 1770-1790
  167. Rischar, Richard, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000: One Sweet Day: Vocal Style in African-American Popular Ballads, 1991-1995
  168. Roper, Eleanor Jane, University of London, King’s College, 2004: A Study of Public and Private Spheres in the Musical Culture of Sixteenth-Century Leipzig
  169. Rose, Stephen, University of Cambridge, 2002: Music, Print and Authority in Leipzig during the Thirty Years’ War
  170. Rutter, Philip, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1993: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds latin 1240: A Transcription and Analysis of the Trope Repertoire
  171. Sandell, Gregory John, Northwestern University, 1991: Concurrent Timbres in Orchestration: A Perceptual Study of Factors Determining “Blend”
  172. Sanhuesa Fonseca, Maria, Universidad de Oviedo, 1998: Educación, Pensamiento y Teoría de la Musica en la Espanha del Siglo XVII (Education, Thought and Musical Theory in 17th-Century Spain)
  173. Saunders, James E., Royal Northern College of Music, 1996: The Final Frontier: The Development of Polytempo in the Music of Conlon Nancarrow
  174. Schiller, Caroline, Florida State University, 2001: A Performer’s Guide to Works for Soprano Voice by Canadian Women Composers
  175. Schlagel, Stephanie P., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1996: Josquin des Prez and His Motets: A Case-Study in Sixteenth-Century Reception History
  176. Schlosser, Milton, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1995: Queer Effects, Wilde Behaviour: Frederic Rzewski’s “De Profundis”
  177. Schmitt Scheubel, Robert, Technische Universität Berlin, 1994 (expected to be published 1997): Johann Ludwig Dussek im Spiegel der deutschen, französischen und englischen Tagespresse seiner Zeit, nebst Verzeichnis seiner in Berliner Bibliotheken befindlichen Werke, der auffindbaren Autographen, Handschriften und Schallaufnahmen
  178. Shaw, A. Timothy, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000 (forthcoming): Reading the Liturgy at Westminster Abbey in the Late Middle Ages
  179. Sheinberg, Esti, University of Edinburgh, 1997: Irony, Parody, Satire and The Grotesque in the Music of Dmitri Shostakovich
  180. Shinnick, Emilie Julia Wingo, University of Texas at Austin, 1997: The Manuscript Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, MS 695: A Codicological and Repertorial Study
  181. Sofer, Danielle, University of Music and Performing Arts Graz, 2016: Making Sex Sound: Erotic Current in Electronic Music
  182. Solomon, Larry, West Virginia University, 1973: Symmetry as a Compositional Determinant
  183. Smialek, Eric, McGill University, 2016: Genre and Expression in Extreme Metal Music, 1990–2015
  184. Špirić-Beard, Danijela, Cardiff University, 2012: Border – Bridge – Crossroads: the Construction of Yugoslav Identity in Music (1835–1938) and the Case of Josip Štolcer Slavenski
  185. Springthorpe, Nigel Richard, University of Surrey, 1997: Passion Composition and Composers of Passion Music associated with the Court of Anhalt-Zerbst
  186. Stapleton, Karl, University of Birmingham, 2003: Czech Music Culture in Prague 1858-1865
  187. Stoffel, Lawrence, Indiana University, 1999: Promotion of the Concert Band as an Artistic Medium through Recordings: An Annotated Discography
  188. Stonehouse, Alison, University of Western Ontario: French Attitudes Towards Metastasio as Poet and Dramatist in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century
  189. Stoupakis, Alexandros, National and Kapodestrian University of Athens, expected 2002: Life and Works of Martino Pesenti (c.1600-c.1648)
  190. Sundin, Nils-Göran, University of Jyväskylä, 1994: Aesthetic Criteria for Musical Interpretation: A Study of the Contemporary Performance of Western Notated Instrumental Music after 1750
  191. Taylor-Jay, Claire Patricia, University of Southampton, 1999: Politics and the Ideology of the Artist in the Künstleropern of Pfitzner, Krenek and Hindemith
  192. Thöne, Raphael D., Universität für Musik und darstellende Kunst Wien/Universität Wien, 2007: Zum symphonischen Schaffen Malcolm Arnolds
  193. Thomson, Susan Nichols, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1999: The Solo Piano Music of Lukas Foss
  194. Toliver, Brooks, University of California, Los Angeles, 1994: Debussy After Symbolism: The Formation of a Nature Aesthetic, 1901-1913
  195. Tomas, Lia, Catholic University of São Paulo, 1998: De musica: contribuições para a elaboração de uma nova teoria musical (De Musica: Contributions toward a New Theory of Music)
  196. Torrente, Alvaro, University of Cambridge, 1997: The Sacred Villancico in Early Eighteenth-Century Spain: The Repertory of Salamanca Cathedral
  197. Trantham, Gene Starr, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991: Toward a Theory of the Music of Girolamo Frescobaldi developed through Computer-Assisted Analysis of Selected Works
  198. Traupman, Carol A., Cornell University, 1995: I dimenticati: Italian Comic Opera in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
  199. Tsakalidis, Stylianos, PhD, University of Macedonia, 2012: Title: A modern process of performance practice and its implementation on Dimitris Dragatakis’s concert for solo violin and orchestra
  200. Upton, Elizabeth Randell, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2001: The Chantilly Codex (F-Ch 564): The Manuscript, Its Music, Its Scholarly Reception
  201. Vachon, Pierre, Université de Montréal, expected May 1998: Papillons, Carnaval, Davidsbündlertänze et Kreisleriana de Robert Schumann: étude des titres, de leur signification et incidence sur la facture des oeuvres
  202. Väisälä, Olli, Sibelius Academy, Helsinki, 2004: Prolongation in Early Post-Tonal Music: Analytical Examples and Theoretical Principles
  203. Valdez, Stephen Kenneth, University of Oregon, 1992: The Development of the Electric Guitar Solo in Rock Music, 1954-1971
  204. Valent, Eleonora, Università “La Sapienza”, Rome, 1998: The Spectacle of Sounds: Lully’s and Charpentier’s Stage Music for “Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme” and “Le Malade Imaginaire”
  205. van der Hoven, Lena, Humboldt University, Berlin, 2013: Musikalische Repräsentationspolitik in Preußen (1688-1797) – Hofmusik als Inszenierungsinstrument von Herrschaft
  206. Vlastos, George, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2005: The Conception of Greek Antiquity in Early 20th-Century French Music, 1900-1918
  207. Wakelin, Emma Hilary, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1997: De Floridi Virtuosi d’Italia: A Study of Three Italian Madrigal Anthologies of the 1580s
  208. Warfield, Scott Allan, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995: The Genesis of Richard Strauss’s Macbeth
  209. Welzel, Martin, University of Washington, 2005: Jeanne Demessieux (1921-1968): A Critical Examination of her Life
  210. Wiering, Frans, University of Amsterdam, 1995: The Language of the Modes: Studies in the History of Polyphonic Modality
  211. Wilde, Howard, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1995: Towards a New Theory of Voice-Leading Structure in Sixteenth-Century Polyphony
  212. Wilkinson, Edward Nigel, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1983: Theory and Practice: An Interpretation of Serialism in the Music of Luigi Dallapiccola
  213. Williamon, Aaron, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1999: Preparing for Performance: An Examination of Musical Practice as a Function of Expertise
  214. Willmett, John Patrick, University of Edinburgh, 2007: The organ chorales of Johann Pachelbel: origins, purpose, style
  215. Willner, Channan, City University of New York, 2005: Durational Pacing in Händel’s Instrumental Works: The Nature of Temporality in the Music of the High Baroque
  216. Wilson, Alexandra May, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2002: The Puccini Problem: Nationalism, Gender and Decadence in Italian Puccini Reception, 1896-1912
  217. Wilton, Peter J. S., Royal Holloway, University of London, 1998: The Transmission of the Alleluia Prosula: Stability, Variation and Change
  218. Windsor, W. Luke, City University, 1995: A Perceptual Approach to the Description and Analysis of Acousmatic Music
  219. Zanovello, Giovanni, Princeton University, 2005: Heinrich Isaac, the Mass “Misericordias Domini”, and Music in Late-Fifteenth-Century Florence
  220. Zeiss, Laurel E., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in progress: Accompanied Recitative in Mozart’s Operas
  221. Zobel, Mark Alan, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2005: “Music Close to the Soil and Deeply Felt”: The Use of American Hymn Tunes in Charles Ives’s Third Symphony
  222. Zohn, Steven, Cornell University, 1995: The Ensemble Sonatas of Georg Philipp Telemann: Studies in Style, Genre, and Chronology

See also:

Please note also that if you are about to complete an ethnomusicology dissertation, or if you are an advisor supervising one, Ethnomusicology Online publishes enhanced dissertation abstracts, which can be expanded or re-written to incorporate selected details from the dissertation, including colour pictures, maps, diagrams, audio, video, animations, or other multimedia; see Mercedes DuJunco’s dissertation in the list above, and contact the editor of EOL, Karl Signell, if you are interested.

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